Adaptive behavior guided by unconscious visual cues occurs in patients with various kinds of brain damage as well as in normal observers, all of whom can process visual information of which they are fully unaware [1-8]. Little is known on the possibility that unconscious vision is influenced by visual cues that have access to consciousness [9]. Here we report a 'blind' letter discrimination induced through a semantic interaction with conscious color processing in a patient who is agnosic for visual shapes, but has normal color vision and visual imagery. In seeing the initial letters of color names printed in different colors, it is normally easier to name the print color when it is congruent with the initial letter of the color name than when it is not [10]. The patient could discriminate the initial letters of the words 'red' and 'green' printed in the corresponding colors significantly above chance but without any conscious accompaniment, whereas he performed at chance with the reverse color-letter mapping as well as in standard tests of letter reading. We suggest that the consciously perceived colors activated a representation of the corresponding word names and their component letters, which in turn brought out a partially successful, unconscious processing of visual inputs corresponding to the activated letter representations.
Patient SF, a 40-year-old Italian man, suffered a prolonged cardio-respiratory arrest in the course of an endoscopic extraction of a foreign body from the trachea. As a consequence, he developed a bilateral posterior brain atrophy, particularly marked in the parieto-occipital regions (Figure 1 ), and a dense apperceptive visual agnosia, a disruption of visual perception with partial preservation of basic sensory visual functions [11] . His post-accident verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of 96 suggested that intelligence was largely preserved. Apart from a slight slurring of speech, language and praxic functions were intact. Standard neurological examinations revealed no deficits in basic somatosensory functions (tactile, proprioceptive, and thermic sensitivity) or motor functions (muscle strength and force). The patient could easily recognize objects by using touch or audition and could detect the presence or absence of light, though in a computerized perimetry test he responded solely to high-intensity flashes in the visual field periphery, 30 degrees or more from the fovea, and not to more central or lower-intensity flashes (data not shown). He could also recognize the direction of visual motion and judge the distance of visual targets based on binocular and monocular stereoperception.
SF could name color stimuli without difficulty, even when presented with an array of up to six color patches, though he exhibited a moderate degree of inaccuracy when asked to point at a given target color in the array of six, possibly because of a mild optic limb ataxia, unaccompanied by oculomotor apraxia. The most conspicuous deficit was that he could not identify or discriminate even simple visual shapes and objects, a disability of which he was fully aware. Visual imagery, as assessed by tests previously used in cortically blind patients [12] , appeared intact. It is relevant for the purposes of this study that he performed perfectly in sub-tests requiring him to imagine visual features of target letters, such as presence or absence of curved or straight strokes and top/bottom size differences, and to describe differences and similarities between two imagined letters. He succeeded in correctly writing single letters to dictation, but when, minutes later, he was shown the letters he had written, he could not recognize them. He consistently failed standard clinical tests of reading and visual form recognition, to the point that he could not recognize single black letters presented against a white background. The patient's near-normal performance in color and motion visual tests was consistently reported by him to match a distinct subjective awareness of the stimuli. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a manifestation of blindsight, the ability of patients with primary visual cortex lesions to react to visual information from the areas of their visual field that they cannot see (their scotomata), in spite of their bona fide denial of being aware of that information [1] , or similar forms of unconscious residual vision following other kinds of brain damage [6] .
We used a modified version of the Stroop test [13] to assess whether chromatic stimuli, which SF could see consciously, could disclose some latent capacity for processing visual shapes by means of a top-down control involving the semantic level. In the standard version of the Stroop test, normally seeing subjects are comparatively fast in naming the color in which a word is written if the word matches the name of the color, and comparatively slow if the word denotes a competing color. The Stroop effect is best accounted for by a parallel distributed processing model in which the two pathways, one for color information and the other for word information, are made up of units that converge onto a shared response mechanism. Learning and attention modulate the strength of interconnections among units to produce the final response according to the demands of the task [13] . As it has been reported that this effect can be obtained just as well with single-letter stimuli corresponding to the initials of color names [10] as with whole words, we have adapted this simplified paradigm to the testing of SF.
SF was examined in repeated tests for color discrimination and letter discrimination one year after the accident. In both discriminations, there were four stimuli: a red capital R, a green capital V, a red capital V and a green capital R. R and V are the initials of the Italian words 'rosso' for 'red' and 'verde' for 'green'. The R letters were 5.2 cm high and 3.5 cm wide; the V letters were 5.5 cm high and their width was 4 cm at the top and 0.6 cm at the bottom. The letters were generated on the screen of a computer, the average luminance being 15 cd/m 2 for red letters and 46 cd/m 2 for green letters; background luminance was 0.1 cd/m 2 . The subject, positioned at a distance of 40 cm from the screen, was instructed to fixate the center of the screen at the beginning of each trial but was allowed to move head and eyes when the stimulus was present. The stimulus remained on until the subject's response. The sequence of stimulus presentation was controlled by the MEL2 software package [14] , which also recorded response accuracy and speed. There were three sessions of 40 trials each for both the color discrimination and the letter discrimination; the order of presentation of the two types of discrimination was counterbalanced across sessions. The succession of stimuli was random, with the constraint that in each session there were 20 congruent stimuli (10 red Rs and 10 green Vs) and 20 incongruent stimuli (10 green Rs and 10 red Vs). In the letter discrimination task, the subject was instructed to press a key with the right thumb as fast as possible in response to the letter R, regardless of its color, and another key with the right little finger in response to the letter V, again regardless of its color. In the color discrimination task, the subject was asked to press with the right thumb in response to the red color and with the right little finger in response to the green color, both regardless of whether it was carried by an R or a V. A forced-response paradigm was used throughout, and no feedback about accuracy and speed of performance was provided.
A control experiment run with the same stimuli and procedure on eight normal observers (age range 31-46 years) showed no differences in accuracy between tasks. In the color task, there was a trend towards a higher accuracy for congruent stimuli (98.2% correct) than incongruent stimuli (96.1% correct; t(7) = 2.24, p = 0.06), but no such trend was observed in the letter task (congruent stimuli 97.1% correct, incongruent stimuli 96.8% correct, t(7) < 1, not significant). Moreover, in typical Stroop-effect fashion, the color task yielded response times (RTs) that were significantly longer for incongruent stimuli (mean RT 415.3 msec) than congruent stimuli (mean RT 393.5 msec, t(7) = 2.51, p < 0.05), whereas no such difference occurred in the letter task (RT for congruent stimuli 424.3 msec, RT for incongruent stimuli 429.2 msec; t(7) < 1, not significant). These results confirm Regan's report [10] of a Stroop-like effect based on the initials of color names, and When performing the two tasks, SF made it clear that he could consciously perceive the colors but not the letters, and that he felt that his forced responses to the latter stimuli were the result of mere guessing. In the color task, his accuracy was 95.8% correct with congruent stimuli and 97.5% correct with incongruent stimuli (χ 2 < 1, not significant), and his RTs to the two kinds of stimuli were statistically indistinguishable (RT to congruent stimuli 1.5 sec, RT to incongruent stimuli 1.4 sec; unpaired t-test, t(230) < 1, not significant). In the letter discrimination task, SF performed at chance with the incongruent stimuli (50.8% correct responses), but his accuracy rose significantly above chance when he responded to congruent stimuli (72.5% correct responses, χ 2 = 11.82, p < 0.001). The accuracy advantage for congruent over incongruent stimuli was 23.4% with the letter R and 20% with the letter V. The overall RT of correct responses was significantly longer for incongruent stimuli (mean 8.6 sec) than for congruent stimuli (mean 6.8 sec; unpaired t-test, t(146) = 2.9, p = 0.004). The RT advantage for congruent over incongruent stimuli was 0.9 seconds for the letter R and 2.7 seconds for the letter V. The patient's RT performance in the letter task is shown in Figure 2 . RTs for incorrect responses were not different for congruent and incongruent pairings (10.4 sec vs 9.2 sec; unpaired t-test, t(90) < 1, not significant).
Although SF's performance showed changes over the three sessions of the letter task, the influence of color on letter discrimination was evident in all sessions: accuracy was better and RT was shorter with congruent stimuli than with incongruent stimuli. In the last session, SF volunteered that he had a feeling of responding above chance, though he still had no conscious awareness of the letter presented on any given trial. Because of this constant denial of a conscious perception of the letter stimuli, SF's better-than-chance ability to discriminate such stimuli, along with his greater speed of response to colorcongruent than color-incongruent letters, qualifies as a form of residual unconscious vision related to blindsight [1] and other similar visual performances reported in patients with cortical blindness from diffuse cortical lesions (for example [2] ), visual hemineglect and extinction (for example [3] ), hemispherectomy (for example [4] ) and various types of visual agnosias (for example [5, 6] ), and even in normal subjects performing some tasks that involve the processing of visual stimuli presented for extremely brief periods (for example [7, 8] ).
In the color discrimination task, SF's high-level performance was consistent with his preserved ability to see colors consciously, and his failure to show a standard Stroop effect was consistent with his general inability to recognize letter stimuli in many previous clinical and experimental tests. Unlike normal observers, who in color discrimination tasks cannot suppress a fast automatic processing of the task-irrelevant alphabetic material (standard Stroop effect), any potential engagement of a residual unconscious processing of the letter stimuli in SF would be pre-empted by his rapid conscious processing of the color stimuli. In the letter discrimination task, however, SF's performance suggested the occurrence of an unconscious processing of letter stimuli that was shown by his more accurate and faster handling of color-congruent than color-incongruent letters. This finding can be accounted for as follows. Because of SF's preserved visual imagery, perceived colors would activate an orthographic representation of the corresponding word name, which in turn, according to McClelland and Rumelhart's computational model of interactive letter and word perception [15] , would activate the orthographic representation of the word's component letters. This top-down influence, concerning in this case the word's initial letter, would act on any existing ability for visual processing of letters by giving an advantage to inputs consistent with the activated letter representation over inputs inconsistent with it. We propose that, in the case of an input consistent with the activated letter representation, the advantage afforded to that input was sufficient to reveal a partial residual ability of SF to unconsciously process letters. When SF's residual Brief Communication 1421 ability for letter processing lacked a top-down support because of the inconsistency between the input and the activated letter representation, this ability appeared inadequate to produce an above-chance performance, despite his very long response time.
It seems important to point out that, in the letter discrimination task, SF's RT to both color-congruent and colorincongruent letters was much longer than his RT in the color discrimination task, suggesting that the proposed activation of the color name and its initial letter followed, and depended on, SF's conscious perception of the color. In blindsight patients, visual performance can in some cases be improved by learning and practice under voluntary control, but the mechanisms of these effects are still largely mysterious [16, 17] . Only recently has some evidence been obtained for a presumably attentional or arousing modulation of blindsight by temporal cues that had access to consciousness [9] . If SF's above-chance performance in the discrimination of color-congruent letters qualifies as a form of unconscious vision related to blindsight, it follows from our results that just as blindsight can modulate conscious vision (for example [18, 19] ), so conscious vision can modulate residual unconscious vision. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Marcel's recent report that two subjects with unilateral visual cortex lesions could fuse complementary inputs from the normal field and the 'blind' field into a single percept [20] . We should stress that, because SF's exploitation of color to aid letter discrimination probably depended on a color-derived semantic-orthographic representation, the facilitation of his performance was very different from reported facilitations of object or shape recognition that rely on the direct generation of shape from color [21] or wavelength [22] . Our findings with SF also differ from the standard Stroop effect found in a globally aphasic patient who was unable to understand the meaning of written color names but showed the typical influence of such names on his response speed in a color naming task [23] . This suggests that, unlike SF, whose processing of written verbal material is extremely poor, in the above-mentioned aphasic patient the visual processing of words was sufficiently spared to secure access to a semantic level that allowed interaction with color names, even though this was completely outside of consciousness. In this connection, we assume that, quite independent of chromatic stimulation, any input or procedure that is adequate to arouse the representation of a color name would allow SF's implicit visual processing of letters consistent with that representation. This assumption can be experimentally tested.
